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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
John Zuccarini appeals from the district court's grant of 
summary judgment and award of statutory damages and 
attorneys' fees in favor of Joseph Shields under the new 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA" or 
"Act"). In this case of first impression in this court 
interpreting the ACPA, we must decide whether the district 
court erred in determining that r egistering domain names 
that are intentional misspellings of distinctive or famous 
names constitutes unlawful conduct under the Act. W e 
must decide also whether the district court abused its 
discretion by assessing statutory damages of $10,000 per 
domain name. Finally, we must decide whether the court 
erred in awarding attorneys' fees in favor of Shields based 
on its determination that this case qualified as an 
"exceptional" case under the ACPA. W e affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331. This court has jurisdiction by virtue of 28 U.S.C. 




Shields, a graphic artist from Alto, Michigan, creates, 
exhibits and markets cartoons under the names "Joe 
Cartoon" and "The Joe Cartoon Co." His cr eations include 
the popular "Frog Blender," "Micro-Gerbil" and "Live and 
Let Dive" animations. Shields licenses his cartoons to 
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others for display on T-shirts, coffee mugs and other items, 
many of which are sold at gift stores acr oss the country. He 
has marketed his cartoons under the "Joe Cartoon" label 
for the past fifteen years. 
 
On June 12, 1997, Shields registered the domain name 
joecartoon.com, and he has operated it as a web site ever 
since. Visitors to the site can download his animations and 
purchase Joe Cartoon merchandise. Since April 1998, when 
it won "shock site of the day" from Macr omedia, Joe 
Cartoon's web traffic has increased exponentially, now 
averaging over 700,000 visits per month. 
 
In November 1999, Zuccarini, an Andalusia, 
Pennsylvania "wholesaler" of Internet domain names,1 
registered five world wide web variations on Shields's site: 
joescartoon.com, joecarton.com, joescartons.com, 
joescartoons.com and cartoonjoe.com. Zuccarini's sites 
featured advertisements for other sites and for credit card 
companies. Visitors were trapped or"mousetrapped" in the 
sites, which, in the jargon of the computer world, means 
that they were unable to exit without clicking on a 
succession of advertisements. Zuccarini received between 
ten and twenty-five cents from the advertisers for every 
click. 
 
In December 1999, Shields sent "cease and desist" letters 
to Zuccarini regarding the infringing domain names. 
Zuccarini did not respond to the letters. Immediately after 
Shields filed this suit, Zuccarini changed thefive sites to 
"political protest" pages and posted the following message 
on them: 
 
       This is a page of POLITICAL PROTEST 
 
       - Against the web site joecartoon.com - 
 
       joecartoon.com is a web site that depicts the mutilation 
       and killing of animals in a shockwave based cartoon 
       format -- many children are inticed [sic] to the web 
       site, not knowing what is really there and then 
       encouraged to join in the mutilation and killing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. "Wholesaling" refers to the practice of acquiring multiple domain 
names with the intent to profit from them. 
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       through use of the shockwave cartoon pr esented to 
       them. 
 
       - Against the domain name policys [sic] of ICANN - 
 
       - Against the Cyberpiracy Consumer Protection Act - 
 
       As the owner of this domain name, I am being sued by 
       joecartoon.com for $100,000 so he can use this domain 
       to direct more kids to a web site that not only 
       desensitizes children to killing animals, but makes it 
       seem like great fun and games. 
 
       I will under no circumstances hand this domain name 
       over to him so he can do that. 
 
       I hope that ICANN and Network Solutions will not 
       assist him to attaining this goal. 
 
       -Thank You- 
 
Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 635-636 (E.D. Pa. 
2000). 
 
Shields's Complaint invoked the ACPA as well as federal 
and state unfair competition law and sought injunctive 
relief, statutory damages and attorneys' fees. The 
Complaint originally named Network Solutions, Inc. and the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers as 
defendants, but on February 11, 2000, Shields filed a 
voluntary notice of dismissal with respect to these 
defendants. 
 
On March 17, 2000, the district court denied Shields's 
Motion for Summary Judgment,2 holding that Zuccarini 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. With respect to Shields's Motion for Summary Judgment on the ACPA 
claim, the district court noted the following: 
 
       (k) While this [Zuccarini's admission that he registered variations 
       of "joecartoon.com" because they were confusingly similar] 
       would seem to be clear evidence of Zuccarini's bad faith, he 
       claims in his response to the motion for summary judgment 
       that his use of the variations was fair and lawful, and that he 
       is using the domain names `for the purpose of exercising his 
       First Amendment rights of protest against the Plaintiff 's domain 
       which has objectionable and offensive material.' 
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had raised a material issue of fact under the ACP A. After 
affording the parties a brief time for expedited discovery, 
the court held a hearing on Shields's request for injunctive 
relief. On March 22, 2000, the court enter ed a preliminary 
injunction in favor of Shields, which requir ed Zuccarini to 
transfer the infringing domain names to Shields and to 
refrain from "using or abetting the use of " the infringing 
domain names or any other domain names substantially 
similar to Shields's marks. 
 
On May 2, 2000, Shields filed a Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Zuccarini filed no response. On June 
5, 2000, the court entered an Order granting summary 
judgment in favor of Shields, holding that Zuccarini had 
registered five variations of Shields's name willfully, in bad 
faith, and in violation of the Act. On June 16, 2000, Shields 
filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs pursuant to 15 
U.S.C. S 1117(a). Zuccarini opposed the Motion contending 
that his conduct did not rise to the level of exceptional 
circumstances and that the injunction pr ovided Shields 
with adequate relief. 
 
On July 18, 2000, the district court entered an Order 
and Judgment awarding statutory damages in the amount 
of $10,000 for each infringing domain name and attor neys' 
fees and costs in the amount of $39,109.46. Zuccarini filed 




We conduct plenary review of a grant of summary 
judgment, applying the same standard as the district court. 
Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F .3d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 
2000). "Summary judgment is properly granted if `the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (l)  We find that Zuccarini's claim of fair use creates a genuine 
       issue of material fact precluding summary judgment at this 
       point, particularly since he only recently retained counsel and 
       had not yet had a full opportunity to take discovery or 
       formulate his defense. 
 
App. at 249 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.' " Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) 
(quoting Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Pr ocedure). If the 
moving party meets the initial burden of showing that there 
is no genuine issue of material fact, the bur den shifts to the 
non-moving party to set forth specific facts showing the 
existence of such an issue for trial. Rule 56(e), Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. In reviewing the district court's 
grant of summary judgment, we must view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 
We review a trial court's award of statutory damages for 
abuse of discretion. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline 
Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1999). Our 
review of the scope and the meaning of the ter m 
"exceptional," as used in 15 U.S.C. S 1117(a), is plenary. 
Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 




On November 29, 1999, the ACPA became law, making it 
illegal for a person to register or to use with the "bad faith" 
intent to profit from an Internet domain name that is 
"identical or confusingly similar" to the distinctive or 
famous trademark or Internet domain name of another 
person or company. See 15 U.S.C. S 1125(d) (Supp. 2000). 
The Act was intended to prevent "cybersquatting," an 
expression that has come to mean the bad faith, abusive 
registration and use of the distinctive trademarks of others 
as Internet domain names, with the intent to profit from 
the goodwill associated with those trademarks. See S. Rep. 
No. 106-140 (1999), 1999 WL 594571, at *11-18. Under the 
ACPA, successful plaintiffs may r ecover statutory damages 
in an amount to be assessed by the district court in its 
discretion, from $1,000 to $100,000 per domain name. See 
15 U.S.C. S 1117(d) (Supp. 2000). In addition, successful 
plaintiffs may recover attorneys' fees in "exceptional" cases. 
See id. at S 1117(a). 
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In Shields's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment for 
relief under the Act, he asked the district court to (1) 
permanently enjoin Zuccarini from using the infringing 
domain names and any other domain names substantially 
similar thereto; (2) direct Zuccarini to transfer the 
infringing domain names to Shields; and (3) awar d 
attorneys' fees and statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. 
S 1117(a) and (d), respectively. 
 
In deciding whether to grant a permanent injunction, the 
district court must consider whether: (1) the moving party 
has shown actual success on the merits; (2) the moving 
party will be irreparably injured by the denial of injunctive 
relief; (3) the granting of the permanent injunction will 
result in even greater harm to the defendant; and (4) the 
injunction would be in the public interest. See ACLU v. 
Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F .3d 1471, 1477 nn. 




To succeed on his ACPA claim, Shields was required to 
prove that (1) "Joe Cartoon" is a distinctive or famous mark 
entitled to protection; (2) Zuccarini's domain names are 
"identical or confusingly similar to" Shields's mark; and (3) 
Zuccarini registered the domain names with the bad faith 
intent to profit from them. See 15 U.S.C. S 1125 (d)(1)(A); cf. 
Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market Inc., 202 F.3d 
489, 497-499 (2d Cir. 2000).3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 1125(d)(1)(A) of the Act provides in relevant part: 
 
       A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark . 
. . 
       if, without regard to the goods or services of the parties, that 
person 
 
       (i)  has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a 
       personal name which is protected as a mark under this 
       section; and 
 
       (ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that -- 
 
         (I)  in the case of a mark that is dist inctive at the time of 
       registration of the domain name, is identical or 
       confusingly similar to that mark; 
 
         (II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time 
       of registration of the domain name, is identical or 
       confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark. 
 




Under S 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I) and (II), the district court first 
had to determine if "Joe Cartoon" is a"distinctive" or 
"famous" mark and, therefore, is entitled to protection 
under the Act. The following factors may be consider ed 
when making this inquiry: 
 
       (A) the degree of inherent or acquir ed distinctiveness of 
       the mark; (B) the duration and extent of use of the 
       mark in connection with the goods or services with 
       which the mark is used; (C) the duration and extent of 
       advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the 
       geographical extent of the trading area in which the 
       mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for the goods or 
       services with which the mark is used; (F) the degr ee of 
       recognition of the mark in the trading ar eas and 
       channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the 
       person against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the 
       nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks 
       by third parties. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1125(c)(1). 
 
Shields runs the only "Joe Cartoon" operation in the 
nation and has done so for the past fifteen years. This 
suggests both the inherent and acquired distinctiveness of 
the "Joe Cartoon" name. In addition to using the "Joe 
Cartoon" name for fifteen years, Shields has used the 
domain name joecartoon.com as a web site since June 
1997 to display his animations and sell products featuring 
his drawings. The longevity of his use suggests that"Joe 
Cartoon" has acquired some fame in the marketplace. The 
New York Times ran a page one story that quoted Shields 
and cited Joe Cartoon. See Andrew Pollack, Show Business 
Embraces the Web, But Cautiously, N.Y . Times, Nov. 9, 
1999, at A1. 
 
Joe Cartoon T-shirts have been sold acr oss the country 
since at least the early 1990s, and its products appear on 
the web site of at least one nationally known r etail chain, 
Spencer Gifts. Shields has advertised in an online humor 
magazine with a circulation of about 1.4 million. The Joe 
Cartoon web site receives in excess of 700,000 visits per 
month, bringing it wide publicity. According to Shields, 
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word-of-mouth also generates considerable inter est in the 
Joe Cartoon site. Shields trades nationwide in both real 
and virtual markets. The web site gives Joe Cartoon a 
global reach. Shields's cartoons and mer chandise are 
marketed on the Internet, in gift shops and at tourist 
venues. The Joe Cartoon mark has won a huge following 
because of the work of Shields. In light of the above, we 
conclude that "Joe Cartoon" is distinctive, and, with 
700,000 hits a month, the web site "joecartoon.com" 
qualifies as being famous. Therefore, the trademark and 




Under the Act, the next inquiry is whether Zuccarini's 
domain names are "identical or confusingly similar" to 
Shields's mark. The domain names --joescartoon.com, 
joecarton.com, joescartons.com, joescartoons.com and 
cartoonjoe.com -- closely resemble "joecartoon.com," with a 
few additional or deleted letters, or, in the last domain 
name, by rearranging the order of the wor ds. To divert 
Internet traffic to his sites, Zuccarini admits that he 
registers domain names, including the five at issue here, 
because they are likely misspellings of famous marks or 
personal names.4 The strong similarity between these 
domain names and joecartoon.com persuades us that they 
are "confusingly similar." Shields also produced evidence of 
Internet users who were actually confused by Zuccarini's 
sites. See, e.g., Pltf 's Exh. 22, at [4] (copy of an email 
stating, "I tried to look up you[r] website yesterday 
afternoon and a protest page came up. W ill I have trouble 
entering the site at times because of this?"). 
 
On appeal, Zuccarini argues that registering domain 
names that are intentional misspellings of distinctive or 
famous names (or "typosquatting," his ter m for this kind of 
conduct) is not actionable under the ACPA. Zuccarini 
contends that the Act is intended to prevent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Zuccarini testified that he was amazed to learn that "people mistype 
[domain names] as often as they do," and thus variants on likely search 
names would result in many unintended visitors to his sites. Shields, 89 
F. Supp. 2d at 640. 
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"cybersquatting," which he defines as r egistering someone's 
famous name and trying to sell the domain name to them 
or registering it to prevent the famous person from using it 
themselves. This argument ignores the plain language of 
the statute and its stated purpose as discussed in the 
legislative history. 
 
The statute covers the registration of domain names that 
are "identical" to distinctive or famous marks, but it also 
covers domain names that are "confusingly similar" to 
distinctive or famous marks. See 15 U.S.C. 
S 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I), (II). A reasonable interpretation of 
conduct covered by the phrase "confusingly similar" is the 
intentional registration of domain names that are 
misspellings of distinctive or famous names, causing an 
Internet user who makes a slight spelling or typing error to 
reach an unintended site. The ACPA's legislative history 
contemplates such situations: 
 
       [C]ybersquatters often register well-known marks to 
       prey on consumer confusion by misusing the domain 
       name to divert customers from the mark owner's site to 
       the cybersquatter's own site, many of which ar e 
       pornography sites that derive advertising r evenue 
       based on the number of visits, or "hits," the site 
       receives. For example, the Committee was infor med of 
       a parent whose child mistakenly typed in the domain 
       name for `dosney.com,' expecting to access the family- 
       oriented content of the Walt Disney home page, only to 
       end up staring at a screen of hardcor e pornography 
       because a cybersquatter had registered that domain 
       name in anticipation that consumers would make that 
       exact mistake. 
 
S. REP. NO. 106-140 (1999), 1999 WL 594571, at *15 
(emphasis added). 
 
Although Zuccarini's sites did not involve por nography, 
his intent was the same as that mentioned in the legislative 
history above -- to register a domain name in anticipation 
that consumers would make a mistake, thereby increasing 
the number of hits his site would receive, and, 
consequently, the number of advertising dollars he would 
gain. We conclude that Zuccarini's conduct here is a classic 
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example of a specific practice the ACPA was designed to 
prohibit. The district court properly found that the domain 




The final inquiry under the ACPA is whether Zuccarini 
acted with a bad faith intent to profit fr om Shields's 
distinctive and famous mark or whether his conduct falls 
under the safe harbor provision of the Act. Section 
1125(d)(1)(B)(i) provides a non-exhaustive list of nine 
factors for us to consider when making this deter mination: 
 
       (I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of 
       the person, if any, in the domain name; (II) the extent 
       to which the domain name consists of the legal name 
       of the person or a name that is otherwise commonly 
       used to identify that person; (III) the person's prior use, 
       if any, of the domain name in connection with the bona 
       fide offering of any goods or services; (IV) the person's 
       bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a 
       site accessible under the domain name; (V) the 
       person's intent to divert consumers from the mark 
       owner's online location to a site accessible under the 
       domain name that could harm the goodwill r epresented 
       by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the 
       intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by cr eating a 
       likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, 
       affiliation, or endorsement of the site; (VI) the person's 
       offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain 
       name to the mark owner or any third party for 
       financial gain without having used, or having an intent 
       to use, the domain name in the bona fide of fering of 
       any goods or services, or the person's prior conduct 
       indicating a pattern of such conduct; (VII) the person's 
       provision of material and misleading false contact 
       information when applying for the registration of the 
       domain name, the person's intentional failur e to 
       maintain accurate contact information, or the person's 
       prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; 
       (VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple 
       domain names which the person knows are identical or 
       confusingly similar to marks of others that ar e 
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       distinctive at the time of registration of such domain 
       names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that ar e 
       famous at the time of registration of such domain 
       names, without regard to the goods or services of the 
       parties; and (IX) the extent to which the mark 
       incorporated in the person's domain name registration 
       is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning 
       of subsection (c)(1) of this section. 
 
Zuccarini's conduct satisfies a number of these factors. 
Zuccarini has never used the infringing domain names as 
trademarks or service marks; thus, he has no intellectual 
property rights in these domain names. See id. at (B)(i)(I). 
The domain names do not contain any variation of the legal 
name of Zuccarini, nor any other name commonly used to 
identify him. See id. at (B)(i)(II). Zuccarini has never used 
the infringing domain names in connection with the bona 
fide offering of goods or services. See id. at (B)(i)(III). He 
does not use these domain names for a non-commer cial or 
"fair use" purpose. See id. at (B)(i)(IV). He deliberately 
maintains these domain names to divert consumers fr om 
Shields's web site. In so doing, he harms the goodwill 
associated with the mark. He does this either for 
commercial gain, or with the intent to tar nish or disparage 
Shields's mark by creating a likelihood of confusion. See id. 
at (B)(i)(V). He has knowingly register ed thousands of 
Internet domain names that are identical to, or confusingly 
similar to, the distinctive marks of others, without the 
permission of the mark holders to do so.5 See id. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. During his deposition and at the preliminary injunction hearing, 
Zuccarini admitted that he registered the variations of "Joe Cartoon," as 
well as thousands of other domain names, because they are confusingly 
similar to others' famous marks or personal names-- and thus are likely 
misspellings of these names -- in an effort to divert Internet traffic to 
his 
sites. He has registered obvious misspellings of celebrities' names, such 
as gwenythpaltrow.com, rikymartin.com, and britineyspears.com. He has 
also registered variations on popular pr oduct and web site names, like 
sportillustrated.com, mountianbikes.com, and msnchatrooms.com. 
Although we do not determine whether Zuccarini's conduct in each of 
these other cases is itself a violation of the Act, nonetheless his 
pattern 
of behavior is consistent with a bad faith intent to profit. See Northern 
Light Tech., Inc. v. Northern Lights Club, 236 F.3d 57, 65 (1st Cir. 
2001). 
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(B)(i)(VIII). We have already established that Shields's mark 
is distinctive and famous. See id. at (B)(i)(IX). 
 
Zuccarini argues that his web sites wer e protected by the 
First Amendment because he was using them as self- 
described "protest pages." Therefor e, he contends, his use 
falls under the safe harbor provision of S 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii), 
which states that "[b]ad faith intent . . . shall not be found 
in any case in which the court determines that the person 
believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use 
of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful." The 
district court rejected this argument based on its 
conclusion that Zuccarini's claim of good faith and fair use 
was a "spurious explanation cooked up pur ely for this suit." 
Shields, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 640. W e agree. 
 
Zuccarini used his "Joe Cartoon" web sites for purely 
commercial purposes before Shields filed this action. 
Zuccarini was on notice that his use of the domain names 
was considered unlawful when he received the cease and 
desist letters from Shields in December 1999. Zuccarini 
continued to use the infringing domain names for 
commercial purposes until Shields filed this lawsuit. 
Zuccarini testified that he put up the protest pages at 3:00 
a.m. on February 1, 2000, just hours after being served 
with Shields's Complaint. Thus, by his own admission, 
Zuccarini submits that his alleged "fair use" of the 
offending domain names for "political pr otest" began only 
after Shields brought this action alleging a violation of the 
ACPA. We are aware of no authority providing that a 
defendant's "fair use" of a distinctive or famous mark only 
after the filing of a complaint alleging infringement can 
absolve that defendant of liability for his earlier unlawful 
activities. Indeed, were there such authority we think it 
would be contrary to the orderly enforcement of the 
trademark and copyright laws. 
 
We conclude that the district court pr operly rejected 
Zuccarini's argument that his web sites wer e protected 
under the safe harbor provision. There was sufficient 
evidence for the district court to find that Zuccarini acted 
with a bad faith intent to profit when he r egistered and 
used the five domain names at issue here. 
 




The district court correctly concluded that there is a 
substantial likelihood of confusion, as well as actual 
evidence of confusion, between Zuccarini's infringing 
domain names and the "Joe Cartoon" mark. In Opticians 
Ass'n v. Indep. Opticians, 920 F.2d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 1990), 
a trademark infringement case, we held that a finding of 
irreparable injury can be based on a finding of a likelihood 
of confusion. The district court determined that Shields will 
suffer damage to his reputation and a loss of goodwill if 
Zuccarini is allowed to operate his offending web sites. 
Shields's livelihood and fame depend, in lar ge part, on 
Internet users being able to access his sites, and he does 
not want his audience trapped in Zuccarini's sites or put off 
by images displayed thereon which they may attribute to 
him. The district court properly determined that Shields 
would be irreparably harmed if the court did not grant the 
permanent injunction. 
 
Zuccarini testified that he has more than thr ee thousand 
web sites and earns between $800,000 and $1,000,000 a 
year from their use. The court determined that any 
economic harm from the loss of the five infringing domain 
names would be trivial. In Opticians Ass'n, 920 F.2d at 197, 
this court held that, in trademark cases, "public interest 
. . . is a synonym for the right of the public not to be 
deceived or confused." Zuccarini admitted that he is in the 
business of profiting from the public's confusion and that 
he does, in fact, profit from this confusion. The district 
court properly concluded that this injunction would be in 
the public interest. 
 
The district court did not err in determining that the 
elements for granting a permanent injunction set forth in 
ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 
1477 nn. 2-3 (3d Cir. 1996) were satisfied, thereby entitling 
Shields to a permanent injunction and summary judgment 




The Act provides for statutory damages for a violation of 
S 1125(d)(1) "in the amount of not less than $1,000 and not 
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more than $100,000 per domain name, as the court 
considers just." 15 U.S.C. S 1117(d). Zuccarini argues that 
S 1117(d) does not apply to him because he r egistered the 
offending domain names before the ACP A became law. The 
district court held that Zuccarini's continued use of the 
domain names after November 29, 1999 subjects him to the 
statute's proscriptions and remedies. W e agree with the 
teachings of Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, 
Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 2001) ("A person who 
unlawfully registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name 
after the ACPA's date of enactment, November 29, 1999, 
can be liable for monetary damages . . . .") (emphasis 
added); and E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 129 
F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1047-1048 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that 
defendant who registered domain name in bad faith could 
be held liable for statutory damages even though 
registration was prior to enactment of the ACP A when 
defendant continued to use web site after the enactment of 
the Act). 
 
In the alternative, Zuccarini argues that he only used the 
web site for sixty days after the passage of the ACP A and 
prior to this lawsuit being filed. He implies that, because he 
only used the web site for a short period of time, the 
district court's assessment of statutory damages was 
punitive in nature. Under the statute, the court has the 
discretion to award statutory damages that it "considers 
just" within a range from $1,000 to $100,000 per infringing 
domain name. See 15 U.S.C. S 1117(d). There is nothing in 
the statute that requires that the court consider the 
duration of the infringement when calculating statutory 
damages. We conclude that the district court properly 
exercised its discretion in awarding $10,000 for each 




The ACPA provides that "[t]he court in exceptional cases 
may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing 
party." 15 U.S.C. S 1117(a). In trademark infringement 
cases, this court has held that "a district court must make 
a finding of culpable conduct on the part of the losing 
party, such as bad faith, fraud, malice or knowing 
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infringement before a case qualifies as `exceptional.' " 
Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak T rading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 47 
(3d Cir. 1991). The district court found that Zuccarini acted 
willfully and in bad faith when he register ed the "Joe 
Cartoon" domain names in an effort to confuse people and 
to divert Internet traffic to his web sites for his own 
economic gain. The court found that Zuccarini conducted 
no bona fide business related to Joe Cartoon and that he 
had no basis on which to believe his use of the domain 
names was fair and lawful. 
 
Although the term "bad faith" is written into 
S 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) such that it is a thr eshold finding for any 
violation of the ACPA, we are persuaded that the district 
court made a proper finding that, under the circumstances, 
this case qualified as "exceptional" and merited the award 
of attorneys' fees under S 1117(a). 6 The record indicates 
that Zuccarini's conduct was particularly flagrant 7 and that 
he showed no remorse for his actions. The court stated that 
"based on the egregiousness of Zuccarini's conduct and his 
lack of contrition, we without hesitation hold that this is an 
`exceptional' case and that Shields was entitled to an award 
of attorneys' fees." App. at A25. The court's interpretation 
of what constitutes an "exceptional" case under the ACPA is 
proper. 
 
We have considered all contentions pr esented by the 
parties and conclude that no further discussion is 
necessary. 
 
The judgment and the award of statutory damages and 
attorneys' fees will be affirmed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In determining that this case is "exceptional" under S 1117(a), we do 
so without deciding whether the finding of "bad faith" under 
S 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) automatically warrants an award of attorneys' fees 
under S 1117(a) and the case law that has interpreted that provision. See 
Ferrero U.S.A., Inc., 952 F .2d at 47. 
 
7. Between the issuance of the March 22, 2000 preliminary injunction, 
through the date of the determination that he violated the ACPA, and up 
until the date of the hearing to determine statutory damages and 
attorneys' fees and costs, Zuccarini r egistered an additional 1,644 
domain names that were common misspellings of other famous 
companies' and/or celebrities' names. 
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